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After more than two years in power, the 
interim government in Fiji remains adamant 
about tackling the many problems that it 
promised to address as part of its ‘clean-
up’ campaign. Among other tasks—it is 
now taking up one of the challenges that 
previous governments timidly attempted: 
reducing the size of the civil service. A 
decision was made in early 2008 to reduce 
personnel expenditure by 10 per cent by 
the end of the year. Two main policies were 
adopted—redundancy and the reduction 
of the retirement age from 60 to 55. The 
outcome of the policy is not yet known; 
however, in early April 2009, the govern-
ment, through the Chairman of the Public 
Service Commission (PSC), announced 
another decision: to reduce the civil service 
by 30 per cent, equivalent to more than 
10,000 positions. Redundancy of filled 
and unfilled posts and the reduction of the 
retirement age from 60 to 55 remain the 
favoured policy tools. 
While the decision to reduce the size 
of the civil service is critical, considering 
the country’s current economic woes and, 
in particular, the lack of response from 
the civil service, its implementation is by 
Fiji’s ‘overweight’ civil service was the centre of 
attention of previous regimes, yet not much action 
was taken to resolve the problem. The attempt 
by the interim regime to address this problem by 
implementing a 30 per cent reduction of the civil 
workforce by 2011 is a bold decision, considering 
the economic and political uncertainties facing the 
country. The retirement age and redundancy policies 
are central measures of the reforms. While the earlier 
retirement age policy might have an immediate 
impact, redundancy is expected to be instrumental in 
the later stage of the process. The interplay between 
Fiji’s institutional setting and the country’s civil 
service culture presents a major test for the policy.
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no means simple. In retrospect, while past 
governments argued that the civil service 
was bloated and needed urgent attention, 
not much progress was made after 1993 
when the idea was seriously raised as part 
of the civil service reform that aimed for an 
efficient and effective civil service. Several 
explanations have been presented for how 
conditions in the country thwarted progress. 
The change of political leadership in 1999 
and the coup of 2000 were, without doubt, 
the key factors.
The economic and political climate 
has hardly improved since 2000. When the 
interim government took over in late 2006, 
the situation deteriorated further. Political 
stability is endemic, economic performance 
is the poorest in years and the morale of civil 
servants is in tatters. Thus, the backdrop 
against which the 30 per cent reduction 
decision has been made is much more 
difficult than that encountered by previous 
regimes.
This article argues that the policy of the 
interim regime is warranted and requires 
immediate action. The main focus, however, 
is on the means to see this policy through. 
While a lower retirement age is on the 
agenda, redundancy is of greater concern 
here—for many reasons. In particular, 
this is a case of an unpopular policy being 
introduced at a time when the country is 
facing an unsettled economic and political 
environment.
An overview of Fiji’s civil service
Apparently, the size of the civil service, in 
terms of excessive employment, is the main 
concern rather than excessive pay. In its 
Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2003–07, 
the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(SDL) government claimed that the
size of the civil service is untenable…
approximately 32,202 established and 
un-established workers are employed 
in the civil service or 32 per cent of 
total paid employment. For a country 
that is small and highly vulnerable 
to internal and external shocks, the 
current size of the public service needs 
to be reviewed. (Government of Fiji 
Islands 2002)
The same view was reiterated in the 
2007–11 SDP: ‘The size of the public service 
increased from 10,000 in 1971 to 25,888 in 
2005, much more rapidly than the growth 
in population’ (Government of Fiji Islands 
2006:96). The 2007–11 SDP points to a 2005 
World Bank report highlighting this problem 
and advising the authorities of 4,381 unau-
thorised positions funded in the budget. An 
international comparison also shows Fiji’s 
central government employment is more 
than 3 per cent of the total population, on 
average, compared with the 1.3 per cent 
average for developing countries in the 
early 1990s (Schiavo-Campo 1998).
While excessive pay can be a contribut-
ing factor to the ‘size’ of the civil service, 
it is evident that this is not the concern of 
the interim administration or of previous 
regimes. While the absence of data does not 
allow a genuine comparison of average wages 
in Fiji and other developing countries, 3 per 
cent of Fiji’s civil servants have emigrated 
annually in search of better opportunities 
and working conditions, according to the Fiji 
Islands Bureau of Statistics (2007). Medical 
doctors, nurses, accountants, technicians, 
engineers and teachers have topped the list of 
skilled civil servants emigrating (RBF 2002). 
Further, a survey conducted by the Bureau of 
Statistics in 1998 ranked civil servants behind 
the employees of statutory bodies in terms 
of average hourly minimum wages, with the 
latter paid F$3.46 compared with F$2.96 paid 
to civil servants (cited in Chand 2004:9).
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Fiji is compared with other Pacific 
island countries using three key indicators 
for the period 1992–2006 (Figures 1–3). 
Australia is part of the analysis (Figures 2 
and 3), although the figures include state 
governments’ wages and salaries. In terms 
of salaries and wages as a percentage of 
the government’s operational budget, Fiji 
is clearly above Samoa, with its personnel 
expenditure taking between 50 and 60 per 
cent of the operational budget compared 
with Samoa’s 30–40 per cent. The second 
indicator—salaries and wages as a percent-
age of total government expenditure—ranks 
Fiji second highest behind Vanuatu, and 
well above Australia, Samoa and Solomon 
Islands. On the third indicator—salaries 
and wages as a percentage of GDP—Fiji 
is rated the highest of the five countries. 
At the broader international level, Fiji also 
ranks higher than the developing countries 
examined in Schiavo-Campo’s (1998) study 
with respect to the third indicator. On 
average, Fiji’s central government wage 
bill was 12 per cent of GDP in the early 
1990s compared with 6.5 per cent for the 
developing countries included in the study 
(Schiavo-Campo 1998).
These statistics should put to rest any 
lingering doubt about Fiji’s civil service 
being overweight. The glaring reality 
begs urgent action to trim the country’s 
civil workforce and warrants the interim 
administration’s bold attempt to reduce 
the budgetary allocation for salaries and 
wages. That said, the decision needs further 
analysis: why 30 per cent? Why not a higher 
or lower percentage?
The answer to this question is not 
simple. Determining the optimal size of the 
civil workforce is a formidable task, because 
of the extensive role of government, the 
complexity of the work that civil servants 
do and the scope of their operations. That 
said, the task is by no means impossible. 
Normally, the size of the civil workforce 
Figure 1  Salaries and wages as a percentage of operating expenditure
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is contingent on several factors including 
mainly the role of government, the degree 
of decentralisation, the country’s economic 
performance, technology, bureaucratic 
efficiency and market potential.
In contrast, finding the optimal size 
of a profit-making organisation is not as 
difficult. Usually, this is determined by 
several interrelated factors such as busi-
ness strategy, objectives and the financial 
environment, among others (Stone 2005). 
While organisations operate at different 
levels, business strategies nevertheless affect 
the size of their workforce. For instance, an 
expansionary strategy means an increase 
in the size of the workforce, whereas a 
retrenchment strategy takes the company 
in the opposite direction.
The interim administration’s policy
Early in 2008, the interim government 
approved a decision to reduce personnel 
expenditure by 10 per cent of the operat-
ing budget by the end of the year. This 
reduction was equivalent to more than 
3,000 civil servants, according to the PSC. 
The outcome of the 2008 decision remains 
largely unknown at this stage. Nonethe-
less, in April 2009, the interim government 
announced a policy to reduce the civil 
service—but this time a much more sig-
nificant reduction was on the agenda. It 
now wants to see a 30 per cent reduction of 
the current workforce by 2011 (Chairman 
of the PSC, Fiji Times, 6 April 2009). This 
reduction would see an estimated 10,000 
Figure 2  Salaries and wages as a percentage of total expenditure
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jobs removed from the civil service in the 
next two years or so.
Redundancy is now clearly on the table 
as one of the means for the interim admin-
istration to see this policy through. A new 
redundancy package is to be introduced at 
the end of the year, according to the Chair-
man of the PSC. This is in stark contrast with 
previous governments’ ‘no redundancy’ 
policy. Fiji would not, however, be unusual 
in the region in following a redundancy 
policy. In the late 1990s, Cooks Islands 
slashed half of its more than 4,000-strong 
civil workforce (Sharma 2007). A few years 
ago, Tonga also introduced a voluntary 
redundancy policy that resulted in a reduc-
tion of 20 per cent of its workforce.
Policy rationale
Economic efficiency, which can be defined 
in various ways (Politt and Bouckaert 1999), 
but mainly in the form of ‘doing more 
with less’, is a crucial element behind the 
retrenchment policy. Producing the same 
or more output using reduced resources 
requires public service managers to take a 
critical look at the cost of production using 
benchmarks and other cost-controlling 
measures. Common practice in many coun-
tries involves the use of diagnostic measures 
to identify duplication of functions within 
and across departments in order to remove 
excess personnel.
According to the interim government, 
the objective is ‘to reduce the size and cost 
of the civil service whilst improving the 
Figure 3  Salaries and wages as a percentage of GDP
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efficiency, quality and timeliness of service 
provided by the government’ (Government 
of Fiji Islands 2007). Simply put, there is 
a need to do more with fewer resources 
without compromising the quality and 
standard of public services. In this way, 
according to the interim government, ‘funds 
are made available for capital projects and 
other needy sectors like health, education 
and poverty alleviation’ (Government of 
Fiji Islands 2007).
Apparently, the deteriorating economic 
conditions in the country are another 
factor compelling the interim government 
towards urgent reduction in the size of the 
civil service. Fiscal stability is perhaps one 
of the main concerns. Fiji is coping with a 
high level of government debt as a result of 
the expansionary fiscal policy adopted by 
the previous government to improve the 
country’s economic performance after the 
political crisis of 2000 (Figure 4). Government 
investment in the form of infrastructure is 
relatively low compared with the private 
sector (Figure 5). The gap is reduced when 
investment by public enterprises is taken 
into account, as indicated in Figure 5. 
In essence, Figure 5 provides a timely 
reminder of the importance of the private 
sector as a driver of strong economic 
growth. Evidently, private investment has 
remained below expectations since the 2006 
coup and, unfortunately for Fiji, it has been 
the case since 1970. Further, the economy 
contracted by 6.6 per cent in 2007 due to 
the poor performance in manufacturing, 
agriculture, fishing, forestry and building 
and construction activities (RBF 2008), and 
circumstances are predicted to worsen as a 
result of the current global financial crisis. 
Compounding matters, inflation in 2008 
was estimated to average about 9 per cent 
as a result of soaring oil and food prices 
(Reserve Bank of Fiji 2008). The sharp 
inflation forced more than 40 per cent of 
the country’s population to live below 
Figure 4  Government fiscal deficit and total debt
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the poverty line, according to the Interim 
Finance Minister. These pressing economic 
conditions certainly pressured the current 
regime to implement substantial cuts to 
the government salaries and wages bill for 
economic resilience and sustainability.
While economic issues are critical to the 
implementation of the policy, other issues 
should also be addressed, including the role 
of government and how it is performed—
for example, is it market or bureaucratic 
oriented (Jackson 2009; Schiavo-Campo 
1996). Obviously, governments that used 
the private sector as a mechanism for service 
delivery tend to have smaller workforces 
than those at the opposite end of the 
spectrum.
Political parties in Fiji tend to have 
different views on the role of government in 
the community. Since the inception of civil 
service reform in 1993 by the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) administration, 
there has been a preference for a smaller 
government—a view that is reflected in 
reforms in Australia and New Zealand, 
based on theory closely linked to public 
choice tenets. In hindsight, there was an 
intention to limit the role of government to 
the provision of public goods and to direct 
all commercial activities to the private sector 
through privatisation. When the Fiji Labor 
Party (FLP) government took power in 
1999, however, the decision was reversed 
in favour of expansive government. Hence, 
public enterprises earmarked by the previ-
ous regime for privatisation were given the 
opportunity to restructure in accordance 
with private sector principles and practices. 
When the SDL took over from the FLP after 
the events of 2000, it appeared to resume 
what the SVT government had started; 
however, not much action was taken.
The contradictory perceptions of suc-
cessive regimes on the role of government 
in the country perhaps contributed to the 
struggle over ‘right-sizing’ the civil service. 
Figure 5  Government and private investment, 1992–2005
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With respect to the present regime, although 
it is determined to reduce the size of the 
civil service, the lack of clear direction on 
the scope of the reform and how the role of 
government is to be performed might not 
help the situation in the longer run. Countries 
that implemented substantial cuts to their 
civil workforce were more specific about the 
roles of their governments. In New Zealand, 
for instance, a smaller government that was 
responsible mainly for policy direction was 
favoured. Hence, policy operations were 
outsourced where possible and most com-
mercial activities were directed to the private 
sector (Scott 2001).
Policy tools: redundancy
The PSC is now responsible for reducing the 
civil workforce by 30 per cent rather than 10 
per cent, as initially proposed in 2008. While 
the lower retirement age and other measures 
such as freezing recruitment are being used to 
reshape the civil service, it is evident that the 
bulk of the 30 per cent target will eventually 
come from redundancies. So far, the PSC has 
identified only 1,164 employees for retirement 
this year. The number of vacant positions on 
hold is not yet known, but it is presumed 
to be a lot less. This will give the interim 
administration no option but to introduce 
redundancy as the measure to ensure the 30 
per cent target is within reach by 2011.
Not much has been revealed about the 
redundancy plan proposed to be introduced 
at the end of the year, including details of 
redundancies at the departmental level. This 
is understandable considering the current 
political climate and the unpleasantness 
associated with the idea. It is, however, also 
evident that civil servants are aware of its 
implementation and are prepared for the 
worst when the policy comes into effect. 
Despite the confidentiality surrounding 
the issue, the matter deserves scrutiny 
for the sake of sound policymaking and 
implementation.
Voluntary redundancy is not recom-
mended. While it has some benefits, the 
costs are overwhelming. Experience abroad 
warrants such a conclusion (Nunberg and 
Nellis 1995). Public officials with extensive 
experience and academic credentials 
are normally the first to volunteer for 
redundancy, for many reasons, but mainly 
because of their ability to find employment 
elsewhere and to generate short-term 
financial gains.
Most of Fiji’s respected civil serv-
ants would likely take advantage of the 
opportunity for these reasons; the pressing 
economic and political conditions facing the 
country would provide further motivation. 
This would leave behind those short of 
qualities to be competitive in the labour 
market. Tonga headed in that direction after 
its massive voluntary redundancies in 2006 
(Amosa 2007).
Compulsory redundancy is the recom-
mended option. Despite its drastic impact, it 
has positive implications for the long term. 
In the case of Fiji, there are several pivotal 
issues that deserve attention if compulsory 
redundancy is to have a positive impact. 
This is the first time since independence that 
Fiji’s civil service has undertaken a massive 
redundancy exercise. Responsible agencies 
are therefore short of the kind of experi-
ence that counts in handling this complex 
policy—especially when experience abroad 
suggests that it is an extremely sensitive, 
distressing, emotional and legally expensive 
process if mistakes are made.
Trade unions in Fiji are aggressive and 
have the stamina to resist until the interests 
of their members are secured. To compound 
matters, racial discrimination between indig-
enous Fijians and Indo-Fijians has marred 
Fiji’s civil service for many years. This puts 
managers in a dilemma in selecting which 
employees should be made redundant. 
Further, Fiji does not have a welfare system 
that supports the unemployed. The social 
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and psychological consequences of this 
massive redundancy could be devastating 
for those affected and the survivors.
Redundancy is a demoralising policy—
for those losing their jobs and the survivors. 
Evidence from abroad highlights low 
morale—or the ‘survivor’s syndrome’—as 
a severe problem facing those remaining 
in the workforce (Appelbaum, Lavigne-
Schmidt, Peychev and Shapiro 1999; Dupuis, 
Boucher and Clavel 1996). The symptoms 
normally take the form of high absentee-
ism and turnover and low productivity. 
These symptoms are caused mainly by ‘job 
insecurity, perceptions of unfairness, fear of 
change and loss of loyalty’ (Makawatsakul 
and Kleiner 2003:56). In this respect, the situ-
ation in Fiji could be severe if not properly 
managed. Civil servants’ morale has already 
diminished under the current administra-
tion. While the 5 per cent salary cut and 
the removal of the Partnership Agreements 
with the previous government were difficult 
decisions to accept, most civil servants have 
been hit hard by the fact that they are once 
again the victims of a political takeover that 
is not their fault. These factors, coupled with 
the militarisation of the civil service, the 
limited employment opportunities abroad 
and the public humiliation of civil servants 
through the media, have dampened the 
spirit of civil servants.
There is therefore a need for respon-
sible authorities to adopt a well-planned, 
comprehensive and transparent approach. 
Some essential actions are highlighted here. 
The surviving managers in the civil service 
will need to be trained in how to break the 
news of redundancy to those affected and 
the type of advice that they will need to give 
to their surviving colleagues. The situation 
calls for responsible officials to approach the 
task sensitively and meticulously.
In essence, the process needs to be 
methodical, comprehensive and transpar-
ent, using constructive diagnostic measures 
(job evaluation, functional review) to 
identify excessive personnel or ‘ghost 
workers’ (Schiavo-Campo 1996), who make 
insignificant contributions to a department’s 
mission. The task should be the responsibil-
ity of the departments rather than the PSC or 
other central agencies. Line departments are 
well versed in the specifics of their opera-
tions and hence are in a better position to 
determine which way cuts should be made. 
In addition, extensive and genuine consulta-
tion is critical. Wide collaboration and the 
use of empirical evidence to substantiate 
the discontinuation of positions have the 
credibility needed to gain the necessary 
support from within the civil service itself, 
the trade unions and other stakeholders.
In addition, where outsourcing causes 
redundancy, the option of allowing and 
assisting those affected to form an enterprise 
to supply the service tagged for outsourcing 
should be seriously considered. This arrange-
ment has its own merits in mitigating the 
adverse impact of redundancy and builds 
resilience in the community. In particular, it 
secures employment and the service of expe-
rienced employees, it promotes private sector 
growth and it creates a positive impression 
of the process. The success of this model 
with the former Public Works Department in 
Samoa warrants attention. In the latter half of 
the 1990s, the Samoan government decided 
to outsource the operations of the department 
as part of its public sector reform. Employees 
affected were offered the opportunity to 
establish their own enterprise. In addition, 
the government provided assistance in the 
form of securing contractual work for 12 
months to help the new company compete 
in the industry. Employees accepted the offer 
and their company has gone from strength 
to strength.
Timing is of the essence here, considering 
the unfavourable consequences of the policy 
and the unstable economic and political 
conditions the country is currently facing. 
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The three-year time frame endorsed by the 
government is a good decision—although a 
much longer period of five years would be 
preferable due to the economic and political 
uncertainties facing the country.
The next move
The attempt by the interim government 
to reduce the size of the civil service as an 
essential component of its long-term plan 
to build an efficient and accountable civil 
service is timely and critical. The task is 
complicated and extremely challenging due 
to the issues discussed earlier; hence the 
journey will not be a smooth or short-term 
endeavour. That said, reducing the number 
of personnel is just one of the many changes 
that needs implementation in the quest for 
efficiency and effectiveness.
In particular, accountability for perform-
ance needs strengthening. This demands the 
reintroduction of performance appraisal for 
public officials. While an earlier attempt 
by the SDL government was scrapped, it is 
evident that it was not for feasibility reasons 
but mainly because of poor planning and the 
failure of responsible authorities to create 
an environment conducive to supporting 
the policy. Fortunately, the Chairman of 
the PSC is contemplating relaunching the 
initiative. Performance appraisal with 
appropriate rewards is critical to the quest 
for an accountable, efficient and effective 
civil service. The potential of the model 
rests on its capacity to identify performance 
targets and to compare real individual 
performance with expected results. If it 
can be implemented properly, it is the most 
transparent way of making civil officials 
efficient and effective.
Performance appraisal should, however, 
be supplemented with other measures. 
While its strength in terms of enhancing 
accountability for performance is widely 
recognised, it does give rise to governance 
problems. In particular, junior officials can 
collude with superiors during the process, 
especially in small countries such as Fiji. 
Other factors such as cultural practices 
and racial discrimination also give effect 
to collusion. The effective use of external 
accountability mechanisms such as cus-
tomer feedback surveys, peer reviews and 
whistleblowers should therefore also be 
considered.
Conclusion
It is beyond contention that Fiji’s civil service 
is overweight and needs urgent attention. 
The ‘right-sizing’ decision by the interim 
administration is therefore warranted. The 
task is, however, not easy and this is no 
surprise considering the feeble attempts 
by previous administrations to tackle the 
problem. Nonetheless, it is evident that the 
present government needs a lot of effort, 
commitment and planning to ensure that 
its attempt will not be in vain.
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